INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is twofold.  It will first consider some aspects of the question, If there is a God, why would He allow evil, pain and suffering?  Second, in response to this question, this article will offer a slightly modified version of the free-will theodicy presented by Peter van Inwagen in Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions. It should be noted, however, that van Inwagen himself denies that his theodicy is “comprehensive”[1] and allows for the possibility that there may be other, better theodicies which his work does not consider.  He simply takes the position that his theodicy is one of many possible theodicies, and, even though there may be other credible ones, his version is, in fact, one that is “possible in the broadly logical sense.”[2]  Moreover, he claims no original authorship of the free-will theodicy and suggests that little, if anything, in the work is “original”[3] that is not “speculative.”[4]  Therefore, any reference in this article to van Inwagen’s theodicy will simply be a reference to the theodicy presented by van Inwagen and will not imply his original authorship.

In undertaking this project, it will be useful to set out several ground rules so as not to unduly complicate the task by digressing into various discussions and arguments the subjects of which the writer of this article is neither adequately informed nor sufficiently conversant and which are beyond the purpose and scope of this article.

First, since it is nearly without controversy that evil, pain and suffering are each, in and of themselves, harmful to an extent, the phrase ‘evil, pain and suffering’ shall be reduced to the single reference ‘evil.’  Although an argument could be made that ‘evil’ can or should be distinguished from ‘pain and suffering’ because evil, or more descriptively, wickedness, in its purest sense, is widely thought to involve immorality of some type, the shortening of this reference is a generally accepted practice among philosophers today.

Secondly, the term ‘theistic being’ will be elevated to the reference ‘God’ as has already been seen previously in this article.

Thirdly, and for similar considerations, this article will use the term ‘atheist’ to refer to both the opponents of theism and the proponents of what will be briefly presented later in this article as the Argument from Evil.

Finally, since the question, If there is a God, why would He allow evil, pain and suffering? itself necessarily presupposes the existence of the God of the Bible, a theodicy can be based, at least in part, on the Holy Scriptures.  If a theodicy is a defense of the God of the Bible in light of the fact that there is evil in the world, it follows that the Bible be accepted as a basis for a theodicy.  In any case, it would be unreasonable to require the theist to invent a plausible extra-biblical explanation for why God would allow evil since theism is the belief in the God of the Bible.[5]  Moreover, the Bible already offers, albeit in a very drawn out and elaborate way, the best theodicy available, namely, a free-will theodicy.  This writer will presume, for the purpose of this article, that the reader is well versed in the Bible’s support of the basic tenets of a free-will theodicy.  Thus, this article will rely heavily upon the Bible’s general message regarding the nature and presence of free will in the creation of mankind, but it will not quote specific passages from the Bible.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL, PAIN AND SUFFERING

The Argument from Evil

The primary question being considered by this article, If there is a God, why would He allow evil, pain and suffering? is, in actuality, a veiled form of what is known in professional philosophical circles as The Argument from Evil.  The Argument from Evil is considered by many to be the best modern argument opposing theism.  A version of the argument is along the following lines:

1. If there were a God, He would not allow evil.
2. There is evil.
3. Thus, there is no God.

Consider, whether this argument is in good form.  Are the premises, ‘if there were a God, it would not allow evil,’ and ‘there is evil,’ both true?  Further, is this argument valid?   Does the hypothesis, ‘there is no God,’ follow from these two premises if they are true?  Before these questions are considered, however, it will be helpful to make one more important point.  The responses given by this article to the Argument from Evil are presented assuming the argument is not a challenge to theists to try to convince atheists of the validity of theism.  Rather, it is assumed, the argument is either a defense of atheism, or it is an attempt by atheists to convert others to their way of thinking. First, while Premise 2 of the argument is certainly true and is almost without controversy, Premise 1 cannot be accepted as true.  The problem with Premise 1 is that it wrongly assumes that, even though the atheist does not personally believe that God actually exists, the atheist would be in a position to know what God would be like if He existed.  This seems contradictory.  One cannot argue that if God existed, He would be a certain way, and at the same time assert that that same God does not exist in reality. Consider this writer’s following analogy.  If Wanda has a map that shows that the shortest route to Clarksville from Louisville is through Jeffersonville, and Gary says that the shortest route is through New Albany, then, in order to convince Wanda that he is right, Gary must either: a). show Wanda that she is wrong because she is reading her map incorrectly, or b). show Wanda a map that contradicts her map and convince her that the contradictory other map is more accurate and compelling than her map. The atheist has failed to do either, therefore premises 2 cannot be accepted as true.  If Premises 2 cannot be accepted as true, then the hypothesis ‘there is no God’ fails, and thus, the argument is not in good form.

1. Thus, in arguing that if there were a God, He would not allow evil, the atheist must either: a). prove to the theist that the Bible has been widely misinterpreted concerning the reasons God has for allowing evil, or b). provide the theist with a contradictory source for knowing what God would be like if He existed and then convince the theist that the atheist’s contradictory other source is more accurate and compelling than the Bible.
2. Second, the Bible is the basis for the theist’s view of why God allows evil.  For the atheist to assert an opposing view of what God would be like if He existed, the atheist must logically support that assertion in light of this fact.  Logic dictates, then, that in arriving at a conclusion about what God would be like if He existed, the atheist should be limited to the means by which the theists asserts the existence of God and why He would allow evil.  While the atheist may hold the conviction that God would be a certain way if He existed, the atheist has failed to show, using the Bible, why God would have no reason for allowing evil.
3. Now, consider whether or not the argument is in good form and whether or not it is valid.  It appears that if the two premises are true, that the hypothesis logically follows from them.  Thus, the argument seems valid.  If the argument appears to be valid, then, does it appear to be in good form?  There are two issues to consider.

IMPROVING VAN INWAGEN’S THEODICY

Theodicy: A Definition

As stated earlier, a theodicy is a defense of the God of the Bible in light of the fact that there is evil in the world.  A theodicy attempts to vindicate God’s goodness and justice in the face of the existence of that evil, and is essentially, then, an explanation of why an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, perfectly good and loving God would allow evil.

Van Inwagen’s Theodicy

What follows is a rough, brief summary of van Inwagen’s free-will theodicy from his previously mentioned work in Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions.

God created the world in a perfect state.  He created human beings in His own image, meaning that they were capable of understanding their own nature and able to love God and to love other humans and were able to be loved by Him and other humans as well.  Love implies freedom.  In order to insure that if any humans were to come to love God they would do so through their own free will, God had to risk that these humans might choose not to love Him.  The only way to make possible the option of choosing between loving or not loving God was for God to build into the creation the potential and opportunity for humans to reject Him.  When this inevitable rejection of Him occurred, evil entered the world.  This rejection of Him is the basis for the evil that is now present in the world today, for all evil is rebellion against God.  In rejecting God, humanity became unable to turn themselves back to Him in their own power.  This is called The Fall.  The resulting ruin of humanity is passed on, in some way, to each successive generation.  Thus evil persists throughout history to the present day and, presumably, will continue until God brings its time to an end.  Pain and suffering results partly from this evil and partly from humanity’s inability, in their fallen state, to detect in advance and avoid such pain and suffering as they were once able to do prior to The Fall.  Humans recognize that their world is hideous because of its evil, pain and suffering.  It is necessary for humans to reach this conclusion about their world in order that they may be turned back to God.  Thus the hideousness must be allowed to continue until the period of God’s unmerited favor in turning these humans back to Himself is brought to a close.  Because of the fallen state of humanity, many horrors happen to them without their necessarily deserving them.  This feature of the creation is essential for drawing these humans to a future hope when such things will no longer be and when life will be lived by them as it was originally intended.  Thus, evil necessarily exists as an alternative to humans’ choosing to love God and as an essential means by which humans can be brought back to Him.[6]

Van Inwagen’s theodicy seems reasonable and plausible.  However, it can be slightly improved upon by the further defining of what is meant by God’s desiring to create a being that could freely choose to love Him and who could be loved by Him.  This improvement is best explained by considering the true purpose of creation.

The Purpose of Creation

To consider why God might allow evil, one must first consider the question, If there were a God, why would He create anything at all?  A similar question would be, What is God’s purpose in creating?  This question has been asked in many forms and numerous ways throughout human history. Van Inwagen rightly suggests that human beings were created to love God.  However, God desired more than just love.  He desired a relationship with His human creatures.  He desired fellowship with them.

An Improvement upon van Inwagen’s Theodicy

With the added element of fellowship, van Inwagen’s theodicy is improved.  This added element buttresses several positions taken in his theodicy.

First, it is more tenable that God created, in His own image, humans with faculties such as the ability to relate to Him through consciousness, emotions, and communication, etc., that humans might enter into a meaningful relationship with Him.  The Bible has much to say about this point.[7]  For example, one could acquire a pet, and love and, presumably, be loved by that pet and could even share mutual esteem and affection with the pet.  However, a relationship of the sort God intended requires much more.  A relationship of the sort desired by God would entail such things as personal intimacy, meaningful communication, deep, sincere love and other such valuable intrinsic features.

Next, it is also more tenable that God’s desire for relationships of the type previously described is the basis for His going to such great lengths to reconcile humanity to Himself, namely, sending his son Jesus through whom those who chose to do so could be so reconciled.  The Bible teaches that God’s love is present even in periods during which humans are separated from Him because of their rebellion against Him.  His desire for relationships with his human creations is more than just a desire for love.

Lastly, God created the universe to support the life of humans and to provide a paradigm in which to fulfill His desire for fellowship.  To insure that these humans could truly fellowship by volition and would not do so by coercion, God created the humans with the capacity to love Him or hate Him.  This capacity ultimately comes down to the choice between good and evil. God is good and evil is a rejection of or rebellion against Him.  Who would want to fellowship with or be loved by a pre-programmed robot?  Thus, volition is a key in achieving God’s desire for fellowship.

The Nature of God

So as not to leave the reader with a false impression about the nature of God, a distinction should be made at this point, between desire and true need.  A desire must not necessarily be fulfilled for a being to be sustained or for it to continue to exist.  By contrast, a true need must necessarily be fulfilled for a being to be sustained or for it to continued to exist.  God has no needs.  Were He to have even a single need, Him would then be dependent upon some outside source for His existence.  His desire for fellowship is not an indication of His having any true need.

Conversely, God’s relegating to eternal damnation the humans who, by their own volitional choice, persist in rejecting Him is neither contrary to His love for them nor can it be considered an evil, for God is perfectly just.

Furthermore, it can neither be said that evil encompasses suffering without regard to the reason or justification that God may have for allowing that suffering.  The atheist may assert that God’s judgment is evil to the extent it brings about suffering.  However, one might argue that God’s justice is perfect in that He not only offered humanity a choice between Himself and evil, but that He went further to provide incentives to them for choosing Him and disincentives for rejecting Him.

The incentives for choosing Him would include eternal life and fellowship with Him, freedom from sickness and pain and amnesty from final judgment, among others.  The disincentives for rejecting Him would include spiritual death, eternal separation from Him, and torment, for example.  If evil comes as a result of judgment to those who reject Him, is not that same evil a good to those to whom it served as an incentive to choose Him?  Moreover, God, had He withheld judgment as a disincentive to rejecting Him, could be accused of curtailing evil to the point of eliminating volitional choice.

CONCLUSION

One Possible Response

It has been suggested by some that there is only one possible answer to the question, If there is a God, why would he allow evil?  These would suggest that no one really knows why God would allow evil.  But, this answer fails as an adequate response for two reasons.  The first reason is the fact that it does not satisfy the need of persons to understand God.  The second reason this answer fails as an adequate response is that it leaves the Problem of Evil unchallenged.  An unchallenged attack against theism scores points for its opponents and potentially wins them converts.  God in His perfect economy has a reason for everything in His creation.

The Position of this Article

This article has fulfilled its twofold purpose.  It has considered some aspects of the question: If there is a God, why would He allow evil, pain and suffering?  And, in considering this question, it has both shown that it is unreasonable for an atheist to know both what God would be like if he existed and, at the same time, know that God would have no reason for allowing evil.  By presenting a slight modification to van Inwagen’s theodicy, this article has also shown that God does have at least one plausible reason for allowing evil, namely, the necessity of free will in His creation.

Thus, it is clear that the hypothesis that there is no God is false.  It is the position of this article, then, that the Argument from Evil fails.  Curtailing evil to any degree would conform the creation to the will of the Creator and would, thus, effectively eliminate volitional choices on the part of the creation, thereby undermining the original purpose in creation, that being fellowship.

A Final Point about the Problem of Evil

The problem of evil is not a problem at all.  In fact, one could argue that evil counts in favor of theism. If evil did not exist, then good could not exist.  Good cannot be quantified or measured unless it contrasted with evil.  The Bible teaches that apart from the law, there is no sin.  It also teaches that the law of God is the tutor or measuring stick by which one is made aware of sin.  To state it another way, if there is no law to which behavior can be compared, then how can there be any sin?  Is the driver of an automobile breaking the law at a given rate of speed if no limit on speed is established or posted?  Similarly, if there is no good by which evil can be compared, there is no evil.

Thus, if evil exists, and it surely does, then one could argue that it follows that there is an inherently good being by which evil can be contrasted.  For is it not good that defines evil? Is it not a sense of morality that separates the two?  Consider the animal kingdom.  There is no malice or guile to be found in it, at least with regard to questions of moral turpitude.  But, God made mankind higher than the animals and gave them dominion over those animals.  God made mankind for the purpose of fellowship.  He did not make animals for that purpose.  If there was a world in which neither good nor evil existed but only moral neutrality, as is found in the animal kingdom, one might well question whether there was a perfectly good God.  Without a perfectly good God, however, neither could the concepts of good and evil somehow exist, nor their reality.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Murray, Michael J., ed. Reasons for the Hope Within. Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999.

Stump, Eleonore and Murray, Michael J., eds. Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions. Malden, Massachusetts Blackwell Publishers, Ltd., 1999.

The New Open Bible Study Edition, NASB (New American Standard Bible). Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, Inc., 1990.

Lewis, C. S. Mere Christianity. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1943.

[1] Peter van Inwagen, “The Magnitude, Duration and Distribution of Evil: A Theodicy” in Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions, ed. Eleonore Stump and Michael J. Murray (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1999), 195.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., 196.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1951), s.v. “theism.”

[6] Van Inwagen, 196 – 209.

[7] God’s desire for a meaningful relationship with His creation is presented throughout the Bible in the cases of such men as Abraham, David, Peter, and many others. NASB (New American Standard Bible).